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WHEN THE UNION HURTS THE WORKERS: 




This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs 
and workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the union 
leads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces a 
welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view of 
workers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration, 
we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union. 
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The number of immigrants entering OECD countries labor markets has been increasing
impressively in recent years. Between 1965 and 2000 the migrant stock as a percentage
of the local population more than doubled in North America, rising from 6 to 13 per
cent, and almost tripled in Western Europe, rising from 3.6 to 10.3 per cent (Hatton and
Williamson [13]).
Large migrants in￿ ows put immigration at the center of the political debate in many
countries and arouse concern in the general public. In the 1997 Eurobarometer survey,
migration turns out to be one of the three most signi￿cant issues. According to a 1995
international survey (O￿Rourke and Sinnott [15]), answers to the question whether im-
migration should be decreased ranged between ￿reduce a little￿ and ￿reduce a lot￿ in
Germany, Britain and the US, three big immigration countries.
Economic reasons play an important role in determining attitudes toward immigration.
As the educational level of immigrants is typically lower than in the local population,
hostility towards immigrants is generally stronger among the unskilled worker who fear
negative e⁄ects in terms of lower wages and/or higher unemployment. Instead, skilled
workers and capital owners tend to support migration as they expect larger returns to
human and physical capital.
Immigration policy re￿ ects these con￿ icting interests as the outcome of a political
process involving the government, social parties, political parties and activists.
When the policymaker is relatively insulated from pressures by social groups, immi-
gration can be seen as a regulatory sphere with the government implementing policies in
the national interest1.
Often, however, migration policy is the realm of special interests. According to po-
litical scientists (see Freeman [9]), an important mode of immigration politics in Western
democracies is client politics in which policymakers interact intensively out of public view
1The autonomy of policymakers from pressure groups depends on several institutional features such
as the locus of decision making (administration, cabinet, parliament) and the license of courts to repeal
government decisions.
1with groups who have a well-de￿ned stake in migration (e.g. employers), while main
political parties seek to avoid open con￿ ict over migration issues. This tends to gener-
ate expansionary migration policy as those who bene￿t from migration prevail over less
organized or less intense opposition.
When those who oppose migration gain additional voice, interest groups politics pre-
vails where organized social groups with well-de￿ned and con￿ icting interests over migra-
tion struggle to in￿ uence the policymaker in their favor2. In this case, the representation
of (unskilled) workers￿interests in policymaking clearly depends on the presence of orga-
nized and strong trade unions, as these institutions play an active political role which goes
beyond wage bargaining in many countries.
Although it is widely recognized that immigration policy is the result of the composi-
tion of di⁄erent interests, there exist surprisingly few theoretical economic models which
provide a positive analysis of immigration policy that explicitly takes into account the in-
￿ uence of lobbies on government￿ s behavior (to the best of our knowledge, only Amegashie
[1] and Epstein and Nitzan [7]).
In this paper we try to ￿ll this gap. We use a political economy approach to study
the determination of migration policy and its welfare and distributional consequences in
an economy where agents have con￿ icting economic interests over migration and the labor
market is not competitive due to the presence of a trade union.
As the union pushes wages above the Walrasian level, unemployment occurs in equi-
librium. Entrepreneurs (skilled workers) support migration as this reduces wages and
increases employment and pro￿ts while (unskilled) workers would rather restrict immi-
grants in￿ ows.
Following the above discussion, we see policy choices over migration as determined by
2Another cathegory proposed by Freeman is populism which is described as a situation where entrepre-
neurial politicians (e.g. Le Pen in France, Buchanan in the US, Bossi in Italy) engage in the mobilization
of resentment among groups whose members believe that they are adversely a⁄ected by immigration as
well as of nationalist sentiments and xenophobia. If succesful, populism may represent a transitional mode
from client to interest group politics as opponents of immigration gain additional voice. Otherwise it will
be a transitory phenomenon with limited impact on immigration policies.
2the in￿ uence of these con￿ icting interests and government￿ s ability to compose them. Our
analysis identi￿es the presence of the trade union as a decisive factor in determining the
outcome of the political process and the properties of the politico-economic equilibrium.
We ￿rst investigate the situation where the level of immigration is determined by a
benevolent government to maximize natives￿welfare (regulatory politics). The presence of
the union in wage determination leads the government to implement a level of immigration
higher than the one which would arise with a competitive labor market. This is due to
the fact that, anticipating that the union will generate an e¢ ciency loss by pushing wages
above the Walrasian level, the government increases the immigration level in order to
reduce wages and increase employment and pro￿ts.
The optimal response of the government to the union￿ s behavior generates an inter-
esting result in terms of welfare. In particular, we show that the presence of the union
induces a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point
of view of workers who would be better o⁄ in a competitive labor market. This happens
as the higher level of immigration pushes the wage rate below the level that would prevail
in a competitive labor market where the level of immigration chosen by the government
would be lower.
These results would inevitably question workers￿support for the union. However, when
the analysis is extended to allow for the direct in￿ uence of interest groups the outcome
may be radically di⁄erent and we can provide an explanation for why trade union behavior
can increase workers￿welfare.
Although several political actors may represent workers￿stances in immigration policy3,
we take it as a fact that the e⁄ectiveness of workers￿voice in the political process is strongly
enhanced by the presence of a powerful trade union. Thus, if interest groups pressures have
su¢ ciently high weight in government decisions, workers are no longer necessarily hurt by
union behavior and may bene￿t from the presence of the union (interest groups politics).
Intuitively, this has to do with the fact that, without the union, the government would
3As discussed above the a¢ rmation of populist movements may increase the voice of those who oppose
migration, including unskilled workers.
3respond excessively to political pressures of entrepreneurs and set a high immigration level,
thereby triggering a large decline in wages (client politics).
To formalize the lobbying process we use the common agency framework pioneered
by Bernheim and Whinston [5], and applied to di⁄erent economic problems by authors
such as Bellettini and Ottaviano [3], Dixit, Grossman and Helpman [6], Grossman and
Helpman [11], Persson [16]. Solving for the Truthful Perfect Equilibrium of the lobby-
ing game between the government, the lobby of entrepreneurs and the lobby of workers,
we characterize the equilibrium level of immigration chosen by the government and the
equilibrium contributions of the two lobbies.
This analysis allows us to derive our welfare results by focusing on a key parameter,
which is the relative weight of social welfare relative to lobbies￿contribution in the objective
function of the government. In particular, we show that there exists a threshold level of
this parameter, such that, for any level below this threshold, workers bene￿t from the
presence of the union.
As we wrote above, this paper is related to the few existing studies (see Amegashie [1]
and Epstein and Nitzan [7]) which analyze a model of the political economy of immigration
based on the activity of lobbying groups. In these papers, however, no attention is paid to
the role of the union in the process of wage determination and to the interaction between
the labor market equilibrium and the political choice of immigration.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the economic
model. Section 3 compares the level of immigration chosen by a benevolent social planner
when the labor market is unionized with the level of immigration chosen by the social
planner when the labor market is competitive. Section 4 studies the politico-economic
equilibrium with lobbies and Section 5 provides a numerical example. Section 6 concludes.
2 The economic model
Consider a one-good economy where agents di⁄er with respect to their source of income and
their country of birth. In particular, we assume that there are H domestic entrepreneurs,
N domestic workers, and I immigrant workers. Each entrepreneur owns a ￿rm. The ￿rm
4is endowed with technology:
y = l￿ (1)
where l represents employment, and y is output.
Agents derive utility from consumption which is equal to pro￿t income ￿ for entre-






where c represents consumption and ￿ > 1 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.4
The labor market is non-competitive. The wage rate is set by a monopolistic union to










is the Walrasian wage. Employment is determined by ￿rms
according to labor demand, which is isoelastic with respect to wage. Denoting with ￿ the
elasticity of labor demand we have ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1.
Given total labor supply N + I, the union seeks to raise the wage above the level
that the workers would earn in the absence of the union, that is the Walrasian level wc.
Moreover, the union takes into account the employment loss triggered by the increase in
wage. The parameter ￿ denotes the weight of the wage gain relative to employment5.
The maximization problem of the union yields:
w = ￿wc (4)
where ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)￿







4As we will see in the next section, ￿ > 1 is necessary and su¢ cient for the second order condition of
the maximization problem of the government to be satis￿ed.
5Our objective function of the union is used in a di⁄erent context by Irmen and Wigger [14]. Alternative
speci￿cations of union￿ s objective functions are discussed, among others, by Booth [4] and Farber [8].
5Since ￿ > 1 the union raises the wage above the Walrasian level and creates unemploy-
ment. In what follows, we will assume that the unemployed can attain a consumption
level equal to b ￿ w:
The number of immigrants negatively a⁄ects the union wage rate through its negative
e⁄ect on the reference level wc. While the decline in the wage rate increases employment
and pro￿ts, the probability of being employed, which is given by
Hl(w)
N+I = ￿￿￿, is inde-
pendent of the number of immigrants (and of labor supply in general) so that workers are
certainly hurt by a higher immigration level. Thus, a con￿ ict of interests emerges between
workers and entrepreneurs that goes through the negative e⁄ect of immigration on the
Walrasian wage rate.
3 The optimal level of immigration
Let us analyze what would be the level of immigration chosen by a benevolent government
in order to maximize the welfare of natives. As for the timing of the relevant choices, we
will consider the case where the government chooses the level of immigration before wages
are determined. Clearly, the rational government anticipates that the wage rate will be
set according to equation (4).


















N+I is the probability that a worker (domestic or foreign) is employed.










where we used ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)l￿: Note that the second order condition for a maximum is
satis￿ed if and only if ￿ > 1:
When considering an increase in I, the benevolent government trades the welfare loss of
native workers (due to the decrease of w) with the gain of entrepreneurs (due to higher ￿):
6The larger is the wage gap ￿; the higher is IG as the government mitigates the presence of
the union by redistributing income to entrepreneurs. Similarly, the higher is ￿; the higher
is w relative to ￿ and the higher is IG: Finally, a larger N and/or a lower H imply a lower
IG as w decreases and the weight of workers in the utilitarian welfare function increases.
It is worthwhile to compare the government￿ s solution in the presence of the union with
the optimal solution for the government when the labor market is competitive (that is, in
the absence of the union). In this case, the level of immigration is chosen to maximize eq.











Notice that IC < IG; so that in the competitive case the government chooses a level of
immigration which is lower than in the non-competitive case. The presence of the union
induces the government to redistribute income in favor of the owners of the ￿rms, thereby
increasing immigration.6
With regard to welfare, we can state the main result of this section:
Proposition 1 When immigration is chosen by a benevolent government, aggregate wel-
fare and the expected utility of workers are lower in the presence of the union than with
no union. On the contrary, entrepreneurs are better o⁄ with the union.
Proof. Plugging equations (7) and (8) in (6) and letting b = w, we get W(IG) <
W(IC) if and only if:
￿(￿ ￿ 1) > (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿) (9)
which is always satis￿ed for ￿ > 1. Both the left-hand side and the right-hand side
term in equation (9) are increasing with ￿ and tend to zero as ￿ ! 1. However, the
derivative with respect to ￿ of the left-hand side (which is equal ￿) is larger than that
6In a di⁄erent model, Schmidt, Stilz and Zimmermann [?] also consider the use of immigration policy
by the government as anti-union policy for possible welfare improvements. Di⁄erently from our analysis,
they do not explicitly compare welfare levels with and without the union and do not analyze whether the
existence of the union can hurt workers.
7of the right-hand side, equal to ￿￿￿1￿￿￿. Obviously, for any b < w, W(IG) < W(IC) is
a fortiori satis￿ed. Plugging equations (7) and (8) in w and wc it is immediate to verify
that w(IG) < wc(IC) , ￿
1
￿￿1 > 1 which is true as ￿ > 1 and ￿ > 1: Thus, workers are















1￿￿ so that ￿(IG) > ￿(IC):
Surprisingly, when immigration is optimally set by the government, the presence of
the union bene￿ts the entrepreneurs at the expense of the workers. As we have already
discussed, when the union sets the level of wages, the government reacts by increasing
immigration. In equilibrium, this reduces wages below the competitive level so that work-
ers are necessarily hurt. On the contrary, entrepreneurs bene￿t from increased overall
employment, and the net e⁄ect on social welfare is negative.
To understand what is necessary for this result to hold, suppose that, in the presence
of the union, the level of immigration chosen by the government were equal to I0 such that
w(I0) = ￿wc(I0) = wc(IC): In words, the government would increase immigration up to a
point where the unionized wage would be exactly equal to the wage with no union. The
￿rst derivative of the government objective function with respect to I calculated at I0 can

















Taking into account that wages and pro￿ts at I0 are by de￿nition equal to those






















Thus, the optimal I must be larger than I0 and the wage rate must be lower than
wc(IC). Intuitively, the existence of unemployed workers whose exogenous income is unaf-
fected by immigration decreases the weight of workers in the social welfare function from
1 to ￿￿￿: As a consequence, the government can achieve higher utility by redistributing
8income further in favor of the agents whose weight is una⁄ected by unemployment, that
is the entrepreneurs.
Notice the existence of a ￿xed ￿mark up￿of the unionized wage over the Walrasian
wage and of a isoelastic labor demand are the features of our model which play a crucial
role in the result. In many models of union behavior, the unionized wage is a ￿xed mark
up over an exogenous alternative income (typically, the unemployment bene￿t) so that
the unionized wage is constant and independent of labor supply (and thus of immigration
levels). In our framework, to formalize the con￿ ict of interests between workers and
capitalists, we need a negative relationship between the unionized wage and the level
of immigration, which goes through the negative e⁄ect of immigration on the Walrasian
wage.7
Our ￿ndings highlight the important consequences of considering the level of immigra-
tion I as optimally chosen by the government. Indeed, a di⁄erent result arises if, starting
from the competitive equilibrium, a union is introduced while keeping the level of immi-
gration ￿xed at IC. In this case, the union increases wages above the Walrasian level,
and, if the utility when unemployed is not too small, it increases workers￿welfare at the
expense of entrepreneurs. More speci￿cally, we can write:
Proposition 2 Let I = IC: Then, the introduction of the union decreases social welfare.











￿￿1 ; the union increases the expected
utility of workers.
Proof. (i) Let Wu(IC) be the level of social welfare when the labor market is unionized
7Another approach would be to identify the alternative income with the competitive wage rate assuming
that the union coverage is not complete. However, under fairly general assumptions, we have shown that,
in a right-to-manage framework, the union cannot do better than set the wage at the competitive level in
the unionized sector so that no wage gap emerges between the unionized and non-unionized sector.
In Appendix 3, we show that similar results to those of our paper can be obtained in an e¢ cient
bargaining model.
9and I = IC: Then:





+ H (1 ￿ ￿)
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which is satis￿ed since
￿
￿1￿￿ + ￿￿￿(￿￿1) ￿ 1
￿
> 0.













Notice that this is larger than
(wc)1￿￿












For any given I; the introduction of the union has standard e¢ ciency and redistributive
e⁄ects. Wages are increased so that unemployment is generated. This reduces social
welfare. Workers will be better o⁄ provided that the cost of being unemployed is not too
large.
Instead, if the government responds optimally to the existence of the union, it will
increase the immigration level to IG: This allows the government to increase social welfare
although it cannot achieve the competitive level. The resulting fall in wages hurt workers,
who would be better o⁄ without the union.
The welfare loss of workers due to the presence of the union raises the natural question
of why workers would deliberately accept membership and provide support for it, rather
than get rid of the union and enjoy a higher level of welfare. The next section tackles this
issue by investigating the political determination of immigration policy.
4 The politico-economic equilibrium
In the welfare analysis that we have conducted so far we have assumed the presence of a
benevolent government who sets the immigration level in order to maximize the welfare
of the natives.
Often, however, immigration policy is the realm of special interests with lobbies rep-
resenting entrepreneurs and workers who seek to in￿ uence the outcome of the legislative
10process in their favor. Once the immigration level (and, more generally, policies which
a⁄ect the labor market) has been set by the government, employers and trade unions
bargain over wages and employment is determined.
According to this description, the politico-economic equilibrium that we have in mind
is the following:
1. The lobbies of entrepreneurs and workers o⁄er contributions to the government con-
ditional on the immigration policy.
2. The government sets the immigration level I taking into account the contributions
of the lobbies of entrepreneurs and workers and anticipating how the wage rate will
be determined on the labor market.
3. The union sets the wage rate taking I as given and employment is determined by
labor demand.
Notice that the lobbies of entrepreneurs and workers do not necessarily correspond to
the actors of the bargaining process on the labor market, namely the trade union and
the associations of entrepreneurs as con￿ icting interests on immigration policy may be
defended by other political organizations, such as political parties, human rights activists,
etc.
It should also be noted that in principle both natives and immigrant workers may be
represented in the lobbying activity. In our model, we restrict attention to the case where
only natives participate in the lobbying activity.8
Following the recent literature pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston [5], we will model
the lobbying game as a menu auction game with globally truthful contributions.
In the ￿rst stage, the lobby j 2 fe;wg o⁄ers contributions Cj that are globally truthful,
so that we can write:
Cj(I) = maxf0;Vj(I) ￿ vjg (15)
8Notice that the degree of representation of immigrants in the political process is low in many countries.
11where Vj is the objective function of lobby j and vj is a scalar optimally set by each lobby






























with ￿ 2 (0;1):
Finally, in the third stage, the union sets the wage to maximize equation (3) given the
number of immigrants I chosen by the government in the previous stage.
De￿nition 1 (Truthful Perfect Equilibrium) The contribution schedules C￿
e(I), C￿
w(I)
and the immigration level I￿(Ce(￿);Cw(￿)) form a Truthful Perfect Equilibrium (TPE) if
and only if:
(i) for Ce(￿) and Cw(￿), I￿(Ce(￿);Cw(￿)) is a solution to
max
I




(ii) there is no other contribution schedule C0
e(I) such that
Ve(I0) > Ve(I￿)
where I￿ = I￿(C￿
e(￿);C￿
w(￿)) and I0 = I0(C0
e(￿);C￿






(iii) there is no other contribution schedule C0
w(I) such that
Vw(I0) > Vw(I￿)
where I￿ = I￿(C￿
e(￿);C￿
w(￿)) and I0 = I0(C￿
e(￿);C0








w(￿) are truthful strategies with respect to I￿(￿).
12The existence of the TPE has been established by Bernheim and Whinston [5]. As
for the characterization of our TPE, let us assume that b = b: Then, we can write the
following result:
Proposition 3 (The politico-economic equilibrium) The Truthful Perfect Equilib-
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if ￿ > ￿￿￿
where C ￿ 1




As it is well known in the literature following Bernheim and Whinston [5], the solution
which arises when all agents are represented in the lobbying process is equivalent to the
solution of the benevolent government.
As we have seen in Proposition 1, this solution hurts the workers, who would be better
o⁄ in the absence of the union. Here, their welfare is even lower than in the case analyzed
in the previous section, since they have to pay contributions to the government. Then, the
same question of the previous section arises of why should the workers support the union.
The politico-economic equilibrium that we have analyzed in this section can help us
to answer this question. Speci￿cally, as discussed in the Introduction, we argue that,
without the union, workers lose voice in the political process and their ability to in￿ uence
government policy is reduced. Thus, although the union can be detrimental to workers
from a purely economic point of view, it could nonetheless be bene￿cial for them in the
political arena.
To formalize this idea, let us consider the extreme case where, in the absence of the
union, workers have no voice at all so that government￿ s decisions are in￿ uenced by entre-
13preneurs￿lobbies only. In this case, the objective function of the government becomes:
G(I;Ce) = ￿W(I) + (1 ￿ ￿)Ce (19)
Notice that, in the absence of the union, the labor market is competitive, w = wc
and there is full employment. Thus, under the assumption of truthful contributions,































Clearly, IE > IC as the lobby of entrepreneurs induces the government to deviate from the
welfare maximizing level of immigration. With higher immigration, income is redistributed
away from workers towards the entrepreneurs.
In this case, it is not a priori clear whether workers are hurt by the presence of the
union. As the workers lose voice in the lobbying process, immigration level increases up
to a point which may make it costly for them to eliminate the union.
Intuitively, the cost for workers of not being represented in the lobbying activity de-
pends on how much the government weights contributions. The higher is this weight, the
more distorted will be immigration policy in favor of entrepreneurs.
This intuition is formalized in the following:
Proposition 4 There exists a ￿ 2 (0;1) such that, for any ￿ < ￿; workers bene￿t from
the presence of the union.
Proof. See Appendix
Summing up, when the immigration level is determined by the political interaction
between government and lobbies, workers may ￿nd it pro￿table to support the union
14in order to be more e⁄ective in the lobbying activity and avoid the implementation of
excessively high levels of immigration. This happens when the bias of the government
in favor of contributions is high enough or, in other words, when the government is not
su¢ ciently benevolent.
Figure 1 shows the level of utility of workers as a function of ￿.
l
W
Figure 1: Welfare of workers as a function of ￿
The thin (red) curve represents the expected utility of workers when there is no trade
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The thick (green) curve represents the expected utility of workers when there is a trade
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A for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
The intersection of the two curves de￿nes ￿: As we know from Proposition 4, for any
￿ > ￿; the thin curve is above the thick curve and workers are better o⁄with a competitive
15labor market and without contributing to the government. For any ￿ < ￿; the thin curve
is below the thick curve and workers are better o⁄ with a unionized labor market and
paying contributions to the government.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a positive analysis of immigration policy when the labor market is non-
competitive due to the presence of a trade union and two distinct groups (entrepreneurs
and workers) have con￿ icting interests over this policy.
Our main result is that the bargaining power of the union in the labor market induces
a benevolent government to increase immigration above the level which would be optimal
with a competitive labor market. The most important consequence is that workers end up
being hurt by the union, while the entrepreneurs bene￿t from it. In the paper we provide
a discussion of what are the features of the model that drive our results.
Notwithstanding this negative e⁄ect on workers￿welfare, a political economy extension
of the basic model, where the government is in￿ uenced by the lobbying activity of (lobbies
of) workers and entrepreneurs, allows us to formalize a possible explanation of why workers
may still be interested in supporting and ￿nancing the union. More speci￿cally, we show
that whenever the degree of benevolence of the government falls below a given threshold,
workers are better o⁄ with the union.
Our research could be extended to incorporate a dynamic analysis which could shed
light on the relationship between trade unions, immigration policy and economic growth.
This analysis could be carried out using a OLG model, where the young (workers) oppose
immigration while the old (owners of the ￿rms) are in favor of it.
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APPENDIX 1
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Using equations (6) and (15) , the maximization problem of the government can be





which yields I = I￿:
(ii) As explained in Grossman and Helpman [11], equilibrium contributions are given
by:
C￿







where I￿w is the solution to (18) when only entrepreneurs o⁄er contributions. Simple






1￿￿ ￿N: The wage level when I = I￿w is given





￿ so that for ￿ = ￿￿ we get w(I￿w) = b: Thus, for any ￿ < ￿￿,






1￿￿ : Some additional algebra yields the expression
for C￿
w which was given in the Proposition.
18(iii) Similarly to (ii), equilibrium contributions for the lobby of entrepreneurs are given
by:
C￿







where I￿e is the solution to (18) when only workers o⁄er contributions. It can be easily






1￿￿ so that we have w(I￿e) = b when ￿ = ￿￿￿:







algebra yields the expression for C￿
e which was given in the Proposition.
APPENDIX 2
Proof of Proposition 4
First of all, let Wu
w denote the welfare of workers with the union (that is, when both
lobbies contribute) and Ww the welfare of workers without the union (that is, when only




N￿H1￿￿￿1￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿(1￿￿) ￿￿￿1 (25)













1￿￿N￿H1￿￿￿1￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿(1￿￿) ￿￿￿1 for 1 > ￿ > ￿￿
￿￿
b1￿￿N 1
1￿￿ for 0 < ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿
(26)
When the union exists, in the computation of the welfare of workers we must take into



















which is an increasing and strictly concave function of ￿: However, it should be noted (see
Appendix 1) that, when ￿ = ￿￿, we have that w(I￿w) = b, so that, for ￿ < ￿￿; I￿w
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A for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
(28)
19After some algebra, it can be shown that, for 0 < ￿ ￿ ￿￿; Wu
w is an increasing and










￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿￿￿)b1￿￿N
￿
(29)
Let us now prove that Wu
w = Ww for only one ￿ 2 (0;1):
First of all, we have that lim￿!0 Wu
w > lim￿!0 Ww (after some algebra) and lim￿!1 Wu
w <
lim￿!1 Ww (by Proposition 1) so that at least one ￿ for which Wu
w = Ww exists. To show
that it is unique, we can use the fact that Wu
w is strictly convex for ￿ ￿ ￿￿, while Ww is
concave, so that the two functions can intersect at most once between 0 and ￿￿: If Wu
w
and Ww intersect between 0 and ￿￿; then this is the only intersection point since in this
case, for ￿ > ￿￿; Wu
w must be strictly smaller than Ww (notice that for any ￿ > ￿￿ the
relevant expression of Wu
w is always smaller of the function in second row of 28, which has
already crossed Ww).
If instead Wu
w and Ww do not intersect between 0 and ￿￿; their intersection point
is unique since, for ￿ > ￿￿; Wu




￿￿￿￿1 (1 ￿ ￿), which is satis￿ed for only one ￿ 2 (0;1):
APPENDIX 3
An e¢ cient bargaining model
Consider the e¢ cient barganing model developed by Fuest and Thum. Assume that
￿H ￿rms are unionized and pay a wage rate denoted by w while the remaining (1 ￿ ￿)H
are not unionized and pay wc. It can be shown that in this framework all ￿rms employ





￿ = 1 + ￿ 1￿￿
￿ where ￿ is the barganing power of unions.








1￿￿[￿￿1￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)]
1
1￿￿





￿￿1 ￿ N (30)
Using equation (30), we can conclude that the higher is ￿ the higher is the level of
immigration chosen by the government. Moreover, it can also be shown that, when IG
is given by equation (30), both workers and entrepreneurs are better o⁄ when ￿ = 1,
20although, for a given level of I, workers would bene￿t from an increase in their barganing
power.
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